14

Posthumanism and Perpetrators

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Who is responsible? Why did *they* do "it"? Were *they* born like this? What pushed *them* over a threshold into violence? Questions like these have been at the heart of Perpetrator Studies. They are questions that focus on human beings as figures whose social, political, cultural, and psychological composition makes terrible things possible: questions that thus prefigure our understanding of perpetrators as puzzling distortions of what makes more or less "normal" human life possible. But what if the emergence of perpetrators was related to something fundamentally *non*-human? What if violence committed between individuals, collectivities, or states was about more than what goes on in our minds, shared societal commitments, and other such fundamentally human preoccupations? Recent "posthumanist" developments in social theory, sociology, and philosophy all suggest these questions need to be asked.[1] They hint that understanding the figure of the perpetrator—however much of a "flesh and blood" human this figure may be—requires looking outside the confines of human bodies, minds, and societies. What happens, then, if we displace—*without erasing*[2]—human beings from the center of our accounting for the possibility of genocide, ethnic cleansing, torture, and other atrocities?

This contribution provides a starting point for engaging with the question of posthumanism and perpetrators. As an approach, posthumanism represents a broad school of thought—made up of diverse sets of theoretical and empirical commitments—beginning with the basic insight that "non-human" things (tools, technologies, natural phenomena, etc.) matter for human behavior. Put in its most simple terms, what ties posthumanist approaches together is a rejection of the belief that material things are merely neutral carriers of human intentionality: material objects are not simply the props through which human life plays out but actively shape, direct, and transform human behavior. Exploring the work of perpetrators through posthumanism can thus expand our understanding of the conditions of possibility for perpetration by adding an appreciation of how the "non-human" also works to make significant difference in why, how, and when human beings become perpetrators of violence. The perspective allows us to see how violence is often more than human in its coordinates.

The chapter proceeds in three main sections. The first section begins by expanding on the theoretical underpinnings of the posthumanist claim that studying "non-human" objects

or systems is important for understanding social phenomena. These insights are then connected to the study of the perpetration of violence and a brief review of the nascent literature within Perpetrator Studies drawing on this approach is offered. The next section focuses on the perpetration of torture to demonstrate at length three key insights that posthumanist theory offers to perpetrator studies. Specifically, it is shown that material objects can sometimes A) pre*script* human behavior, B) *circulate* knowledge of violence, and C) *compel* human beings to act violently. The first of these claims focuses on how material objects contain scripts for violent behavior that subconsciously provide cues and repertoires of possible (violent) action. The second claim highlights how the spatial circulation of material objects leads to the unintentional spreading of particular patterns of (perpetrating) violence over the world. The final claim demonstrates how non-human objects and their scripts also contain "affective" capacities that, more than suggesting or directing violence, can be seen as "compelling" human beings to perpetrate violent acts. Each of these claims is supported by concrete empirical examples. The third and final section of the chapter outlines the challenges that posthumanism poses to Perpetrator Studies concerning, in particular, the issue of adjudicating responsibility, before closing in on the promises the approach nonetheless offers the field.

The Importance of the Non-human

Perpetrator Studies has always had a humanistic focus. To some degree, this focus has its origins in Hannah Arendt's (1958, 1963) deconstruction of Adolf Eichmann's *personal* role in the Holocaust and the legacy of that work in shaping inquiries into perpetrators (c.f.: Browning 1993; Huggins et al. 2002). But human beings—it will be clear—do not live (intersubjectively) alone in the world. Perpetrators are surrounded by tools, technologies, infrastructures, natural environmental features, and many other things that collectively make the world a complicated place. These "non-human" objects alter, instruct, affect, and make demands upon human beings, perpetrators or not. Indeed, the easiest way to see the importance of the post-human attribution of "agency" to material objects is to step away from the most egregious instances of perpetration in human history (the Holocaust, the Killing Fields of Cambodia, etc.) and to a more "everyday" form of violence where social and political discourses already partially incorporate an understanding of posthumanist claims. For example, debates over gun control in the United States have long focused on the fact that the number of human perpetrators who carry out massacres, acts of domestic violence, or terrorist incidents is dramatically increased by the widespread availability of firearms. As Bruno Latour writes:

> "Guns kill people" is a slogan of those who try to control the unrestricted sale of guns. To which the National Rifle Association replies with another slogan, "Guns don't kill people, people kill people". The first slogan is materialist: the gun acts by virtue of *material* components irreducible to the social qualities of the gunman. On account of the gun the law-abiding citizen, a good guy, becomes dangerous. The NRA, meanwhile, offers (amusingly enough, given its political views) a *sociological* version more often associated with the Left: that the gun does nothing in and of itself or by virtue of its material components. The gun is a tool … a neutral carrier of human will.
>
> *(1999, 176–177)*

If readers believe that gun control of one sort or another is a good thing then they are *already* posthumanist (or "materialist") thinkers. The example of gun control suggests that the mere possession or availability of weapons *transforms* human beings into a potentially more dangerous form than they would be in its absence. But even if readers do not support gun control, then the material safety measures found in automobiles, aircraft, and modern construction projects similarly demonstrate how the materiality of the world alters human behavior.[3] Indeed, it is possible to be even more basic here. The reader of this chapter is—hopefully—sitting comfortably, in an ergonomically designed chair. In the absence of such materially provided comfort, we all behave differently: we become fatigued, bad tempered, and work less effectively. Another case in point: psychologists have shown how individuals behave "better" and are more generous when childhood toys like teddy bears are present (Gino and Desai 2012). All these examples demonstrate the basic claim of posthumanism: material objects like guns, teddy bears, and chairs all possess "agency" in the sense that they change human behavior.[4]

This basic principle of posthuman thought—that human beings or their collectivities do not act in isolation from material, environmental, and other non-human aspects of the world—has many different, more specific, theoretical expressions. These include approaches integrating feminist thought (Haraway 1988, 2016), the use of quantum or complexity theory to understand the relation between humans and non-humans (Barad 2003, 2007), the use of pragmatist sociology or philosophy (Harman 2007; Stengers 2010), a greater focus on technology (Hayles 1999; Hansen 2000; Harman 2002, 2005, 2016), and beyond (Wolfe 2010). Within Perpetrator Studies, specifically, the approach is still nascent, despite basic elements of the claims of posthumanism being found in much earlier psychological studies of violence (Berkowitz and Lepage 1967), core theoretical texts that explore the emergence of violence (Scarry 1985), as well as some attention to these issues being displayed in the classical studies of Zimbardo and Milgram (Milgram 1963; Zimbardo 2007, c.f.: Stengers 1997). Nonetheless, a growing trend integrating posthumanist thought into Perpetrator Studies has begun.

Recent work within perpetrator studies employing elements of posthumanism includes studies by Clegg et al. (2012, 2013) and Cunha et al. (2014, 2015) of the Cambodian genocide. There, Clegg, Cunha, and their colleagues explore how everyday objects like books, chairs, uniforms, walls, and weapons work to A) "authorize" violence by legitimizing its ideological basis, B) "make sense" of and give meaning to violence for individual perpetrators, and C) "enable" violence by perpetrators by providing both the means for its use and specific "scripts" for perpetrators to follow. In a similar vein, I have explored the perpetration of torture through posthumanist approaches, developing a "non-purposeful" account of the emergence of this form of political violence in which material objects and natural environments play a central role in suggesting the possibility of torture to acting human subjects (Austin 2016b, 2017a, 2017b, 2019b). In particular, I trace how the circulation of material objects is especially important in contributing to the "standardization" of specific techniques of perpetration (e.g., waterboarding) across borders and state type. Others have drawn on similar approaches to explore the role of material agency in developing drone warfare (Leander 2013; Kindervater 2017), germ warfare (du Plessis 2017), concentration camps (Netz 2004; Meiches 2015), and beyond (c.f.: Bousquet et al. 2017).

Perpetrators and Posthumanism in Action

To see the value of posthumanism for Perpetrator Studies, we can now turn to a second "real world" example that is more typical in its contours for the field than gun control in the United

States necessarily is. Consider the following US soldier's description of a prisoner he detained "in the field" during the occupation of Iraq who was:

> Bound to a chair and interrogated. During the course of the interrogation the team beat him, shocked him at various places on his body with the electrical cord torn from a lamp. That technique was suggested by a squad member who claimed to have seen it used in a movie.
>
> *(Tsukayama 2014, 186)*

This single short example contains evidence of at least *three* ways in which material objects both make perpetration (of torture, in this case) possible and—indeed—produce the figure of the perpetrator. In the remainder of this text, I focus on these three elements, which are most commonly employed within "pragmatist" approaches to posthumanism (including Actor-Network Theory and variants of assemblage theory[5]). Nonetheless, most posthumanist approaches would agree with their relevance even where they also identify a multitude of other "agentic" effects of the non-human.[6] The three "effects" of non-human agents found in the above example are: 1) the (pre)scripting of human behavior through the presence of non-human objects, 2) the global "circulation" of and "convergence" in violent practices across borders through the ways material objects move, and 3) the affective "compelling" of violence by non-human objects. Abstractly, these will seem unclear. Taking the example of the US soldier cited above and other examples, I will therefore now unpack each of these effects in turn.

Prescripting Perpetration

Seemingly innocuous little objects like lamps can lay out "scripts" for human behavior in particular settings. Within Actor-Network Theory, this process is described as occurring through the socio-technical "black-boxing" of different "capacities" (c.f. DeLanda 2016) in material objects (Brown and Capdevila 1999; Barron 2003). Put simply, the idea here is that any material object, especially those that are more technologically advanced, represents a degree of "congealed labor" compressed into material form: these objects "do things" that would otherwise require the work of (usually) many human beings to achieve (Latour 1999, 189). Speed bumps on roads, for example, reduce excessive speeding by motorists and prevent accidents, without the need for the police to be present. In doing so, they *de facto* "replace" the labor of the police in this respect.

In our opening example, a group of US soldiers used electrical torture on a prisoner based on the ways that one soldier had previously become aware of or been "subjectified" towards the possibility of modifying an everyday lamp for that purpose through a cinematic frame of reference. Much as a chair prescripts our behavior in certain ways—a chair is for sitting down on—so everyday objects can equally prompt violent repertoires of actions within human minds: scripting particular ways of perpetrating violations of human rights or humanitarian law. In the case of the lamp, this object contains the capacity to harm individuals (electricity), the tools needed to apply that harm (wires, cables), and—most importantly—is already available in everyday rooms, including the one you are sitting in. Whereas, in the past (i.e., the Inquisition), torture was most frequently employed through the use of objects *designed* for that purpose (i.e., any of the objects found in a macabre "Torture Museum"), today the labor needed to torture is congealed in everyday objects, which "suggest" their use in these ways when human beings have knowledge of that capacity (i.e., through movies) (Austin 2016b).

Take another example. In my own interviews with Syrian perpetrators of torture, a man named *Ali* was describing to me the use of an AK-47-variant assault rifle to carry out the torture technique known in the Middle East as the *falaqa*, which involves the immobilization of the victim's feet and their whipping (Edston 2009). In this case, the immobilization of the feet was achieved with the AK-47 rifle, which provides a "brace" on which the victim's feet can be laid and raised up, held on either side by two perpetrators, whilst a third whips the feet. *Ali* described the use of the AK-47 for this purpose thus:

> You see how good this tool is? *It tells you what to do?* Once you've played a game or seen it on TV or something … that's how it works. Even for you! I've seen the *falaqa* used like this before. When we were training [after conscription to the Syrian army], they [higher rank soldiers] used it against us, and—well—this is just a children's punishment here. We've seen it on TV, everywhere … That's how we know, I guess.[7]

Material objects like rifles, *Ali* suggest here, *tell people what to do.* They provide a repertoire of scripts for perpetrators that can be drawn upon at moments of violence and so order the particular direction in which violent abuse moves, without a great deal of human deliberation. In order to see how this precisely occurs, however, we now also need to look more precisely at how men like *Ali* or that aforementioned soldier become slowly "subjectified" towards these possibilities in different ways.

Circulating Perpetration

The preceding example of the use of a lamp to torture a body reflects a second aspect of importance in considering the role of material objects in perpetration: *circulation*. That US soldier came to be aware of the possibility of using a lamp for torture through motion pictures. In other cases, individuals become aware of how to torture through novels, comic books, children's games, sporting rituals, etc.: a host of different representational artifacts whose purpose was not originally to disseminate information on torture (Rejali 2007; Austin 2016b, 2017a). What is critical to understand about these representational artifacts, and the way they integrate material objects (e.g., lamps) is that they circulate freely across time and space. In the terms of Bruno Latour (2005, 207–216), these objects are "circulating subjectifiers" that allow knowledge of "how to" perpetrate violence to circulate through our normal lives. And these circulating subjectifiers have led—in posthumanist thought—to a certain "convergence" in the types of violence seen across the world (Keeley 1996; Rejali 2007; Austin 2016b; Austin and Bocco 2017). Torture, for example, occurs in strikingly similar ways across the world: US soldiers can be found using *precisely* the same techniques of harm in Guantanamo Bay as North Korean soldiers employ, without any direct cooperation in their work (Austin 2016b, 3–4).

The ways in which material objects (whether lamps, movies, or novels) circulate prescriptions for perpetration across borders has become increasingly important given that most forms of violent abuse are *not* trained for (Rejali 2007). It is through these material conditions of possibility, instead, that most people learn "how to" perpetrate abusive violence.

Take another example to affirm this point. In the Northern Iraqi town of Sulaymaniyah lies an abandoned prison. That prison—now converted into a museum—contains a bare set of rooms filled with a few objects, here and there: chairs, tables, hooks, etc. One object (depicted in Figure 14.1) is of particular interest. This object is a military field telephone, which has a rather interesting history. The development of small and portable field radios

Figure 14.1 An M-63 Field Telephone used for torture found at the Amna Suraka Prison in Sulaymaniyah, Iraq, author's photograph.

was central to opening up the possibility of rapid military mobilities. Like many such objects—the jerrycan, the rifle, the armored vehicle—its advantages as a warfaring ally were quickly realized across the world. The result was imitation. In the former Yugoslavia, a small manufacturing company named *Iskra Mehanizmi* was tasked with developing a variant of the US military TA–314 series field telephones. They created the M-63 Field Telephone.[8] Circuitously, the telephone reached Iraq at an unknown date, alongside thousands of Kalashnikov rifles and other equipment imported from Eastern Europe. Having arrived in Iraq, the object led several lives. It was involved in the everyday military operations of the Baathist state. But it also coordinated the movement of Iraqi forces during the Anfal Genocide and—eventually—enabled the use of electrical torture against the bodies of thousands of Kurds in Sulaymaniyah over many years. It became—without any purpose or design—a prominent and in fact globalized tool of torture.

The possibility of using field telephones like these for electrical torture seems to have first been discovered by the French in colonial-era Algeria (Rejali 2001). Shortly, the procedure would reach Vietnam where US forces orchestrated what they euphemistically termed "Bell Telephone Hours" that precisely echoed the methods of the French (Burke 2004, 110). From there, the procedure traveled to Iraq and far beyond. Indeed, the procedure even returned to the domestic sphere of the United States. One veteran of Vietnam named Jon Burge, for example, later became a Chicago police detective who was accused of, in 1985, torturing an African American named Leonard Hinton (Conroy 2005). Hinton described going underground to a basement where "his hands were handcuffed above his head, his pants and shorts were pulled down, his ankles were handcuffed … " and then:

> The officer with the moustache and with the glasses with the black hair, he came in with a rod, and one was carrying a box, a black box … There was a cord to the long rod … The handle on it was black and they plugged the wire into the box … Then they put something in my mouth … it was cloth … and they tied it so I couldn't holler … Then they took the rod, long part, and they placed it under my genitals … [It was] a pain out of this world. I couldn't describe it … They said, "Are you ready to talk yet?" The other said, "I don't think he's ready to talk yet." He hit me with it again. […] Then … he touched it in the crack of my rectum … Then he took that [cloth] out of my mouth. I said, "I am ready to talk. Tell me what you want me to say, sir. Please stop."
>
> *(Conroy 2005)*

The circulation of electrical torture has depended precisely on the way that its conditions for possibility (its "congealed labor") are compressed into little boxes like field radios or *Tasers* and the knowledge of how to use these devices for harm is spread through films, novels, and other representational artifacts. These objects circulate freely across borders and generally do so quite legitimately but in doing so also carry the capacity and knowledge to perpetrate torture.

Compelling Perpetration

The prescripting and circulating of perpetration through material objects, as described above, relates at its most basic level to the way that non-human things can "suggest," "hint," or "whisper" the possibility of violence to individuals. But non-human objects can also do more than that: sometimes they can directly *compel* violence. Consider the following example:

> The environment here is completely different. It's like living in the Wild West or something—the normal rules don't seem to apply. For example, here we kill people for driving too close to us, so I guess soldiers figure what's the big deal about a restraint chair or double litters, after all "it's still a lot better than what Saddam was doing to them."
>
> *(Keller 2007, 55)*

These words come from a US Soldier—Michael Keller—who was stationed in Abu Ghraib *after* the revelations of torture there became public. Keller is justifying the use of a "restraint chair" and/or "double litters" (two stretchers placed underneath and on top of a detainee with weight placed on the top to compress the body) based on the "completely different" world he had come to live in. In this case, certain material objects (chairs) contain scripts for violence that individuals like Keller became aware of through various circulating subjectifiers. However, when then placed in a particular "situation" or "taskscape" (the "Wild West") (Ingold 2000; Collins 2007) that incorporates various human and non-human elements, these factors then worked to *compel* violence by creating a different world without any "normal rules." They not only made violence possible but worked to *make it happen*.

Non-human objects, environments, and phenomena can thus "compel" violence based on the ways they are collectively assembled in certain environments. In the terms of posthumanist theory, this relates to the "assemblage" or "actor-network" that is relationally constructed around acting human beings (DeLanda 2016). These assemblages construct situations that place certain stresses or pressures on human beings—the fear of death, emotions of anger and fear, etc.—that force them to do "something." In a situation in which "something must be done" (e.g., "state of emergency"), non-human objects and their scripts for action

can directly compel violence by providing a straightforward and immediately available path. Indeed, most firsthand accounts from torturers stress the lack of "choice" they had in their actions along these lines.[9]

In circumstances like these, direct human choice or purposefulness becomes less salient, as the precise direction in which humans act is at least partially affectively delegated to non-human circumstances. Here, then: "responsibility for action must be shared among the various [inter]actants" found in a particular situation (Latour 1999, 170). A helpful analogy can be drawn here with police shootings in the United States, which will help "de-dramatize" our claims by distancing us from the socio-political complexities of torture. In one recent police shooting, an African-American man named Charles Kinsey was non-fatally shot by police while assisting an autistic man whom police incorrectly feared was holding a gun and had thus surrounded. Kinsey recounts:

> I thought it was a mosquito bite, and when it hit me I had my hands in the air, and I'm thinking, "I just got shot!" I'm saying, "Sir, why did you shoot me?", and his words to me were, "I don't know."
>
> *(Chappell 2016)*

The policeman who shot Kinsey is reported as also having been asked by another officer, "Why did you shoot this guy?," to which the shooter replied again, "I don't know" (Bagg 2016). This immediate assertion by perpetrators of a lack of knowledge of "why" they carried out their acts (whatever they might say later in the court room) reflects the ways in which particular "situations" in which violence occurs are filled with non-human elements that affectively compel violence without cognitive deliberation (Austin and Bocco 2017). Indeed, within both this story and that of the US soldier with which we opened, we find 1) a situation that affectively "cues" violence, 2) material objects with the capacity to be used for violence (the gun, the lamp) and which suggests a particular script for how to perpetrate violence; and 3) scripts for violence derived from a popular-cultural representative artifacts (movies, notions of the "hard" police officer, etc.). Indeed, to return to our earlier example of the use of a lamp to carry out electrical torture, that particular story comes from an individual who was initiated into these events entirely by "surprise" (Tsukayama 2014, 162). He was—before going to Iraq—an ordinary individual who became a torturer to a great degree through the posthuman dynamics described herein. The consequences for his self-worth and psyche were substantial: he describes how, whilst in Iraq and after his return to the United States, he "kept telling [him]self it was somebody else [who tortured], it wasn't me … I just kept believing that it was somebody else that did it," because "I … thought that they [second person] were a monster. (Pause) That that person had no place back in the States. I had no place back in the States" (Ibid: 212).

The Importance of Considering Posthumanism

As mentioned earlier, the three preceding posthuman insights into the perpetration of violence only scratch the surface of the more extended ontological and epistemological claims made by posthumanist thought.[10] But they provide a good grounding for beginning to think about how posthumanism can connect to Perpetrator Studies in very concrete terms. Nonetheless, challenges specific to Perpetrator Studies do exist in employing posthumanist thought, which we must now touch upon. Indeed, one quite strong objection to thinking in posthuman terms about perpetrators will likely be immediately obvious from this

discussion: the question of accountability and responsibility. Integrating posthumanist thought into the study of political violence seems to risk diluting our capacity to attribute responsibility to individual perpetrators, those who enabled them, and the broader society in which they emerged. The suggestion that non-human objects prescribe, circulate, and compel the perpetration of political violence can appear to denude human beings of agency and, so, our ability to "judge" right and wrong in particular circumstances.

This concern is real and important. However, a strong distinction must be made between more theoretical and sociological accountings of perpetration and the distinct concerns of legal or political thinking about perpetrators (Austin and Bocco 2017; Austin 2019a). Posthuman forms of sociological accounting are fundamentally about complexifying our understanding of how events happen in the world (Law 2004). The approach provides a set of "terms and sensitivities" that allow us to deepen our understanding of how perpetration happens by incorporating the non-human (Mol 2011). And the importance of this task lies in the simple fact that despite the vast array of more humanist accountings for the perpetration of violence in the literature, the figure of the perpetrator continues to escape our full understanding and—moreover—the perpetration of innumerable crimes only continues in human history. Seeking a deeper posthuman understanding of perpetration is—thus—just one further effort to better understand this most pressing of human concerns, perhaps for the benefit of all society.

Indeed, and to conclude, there are therefore at least three good reasons for incorporating the philosophy, theory, and sociology of posthumanism into Perpetrator Studies more widely. The first relates to the general significance that both victims and perpetrators of violence attribute to non-human objects. In the aftermath of the Argentine "Dirty War," for example, the names for innumerable everyday objects—barbecues, tickets, trucks, egg cartons, etc.—have all now become inescapably linked to particular practices of violence (respectively, the burning of dead bodies, the sign of imminent execution, the means used to transport prisoners for execution, the sound-proofing used on the walls of torture chambers) (Feitlowitz 1998). Indeed, accounts of the perpetration of violence are suffused with references to non-human objects and their distortion towards causing pain (Scarry 1985). Incorporating posthumanist thought allows us to better understand the role of these objects and thus their significance both during and *after* periods of violence have occurred.

Secondly, posthumanist approaches deepen our understanding of the emergence of violence by—perhaps paradoxically—dramatically *humanizing* the figure of the perpetrator. If the approach reveals, quite often, that perpetrators are "compelled" into their acts by the different human and non-human elements that make up particular situations, then we gain a deeper understanding of the powerlessness that many perpetrators have attested to across the course of history. This may make some uneasy, of course (Austin, 2019b). The third, and perhaps most important reason, relates to what many feel must remain an overarching goal of Perpetrator Studies: moving explanation and understanding towards *preventing* the emergence of perpetrators. If posthuman approaches can show that the non-human environments in which violence occurs are contributory factors in encouraging perpetration, then we open up a quite new avenue through which to consider possibilities for preventing the emergence of perpetrators by altering those material environments (Austin 2016a).

Notes

1 For a review of these approaches see Wolfe (2010).
2 It is very important to note that posthumanist thought is explicitly *not* about effacing the human subject as of central importance to understanding the workings of the world, as certain *anti-*

humanist approaches suggest. Instead, and as this discussion stresses throughout, posthumanism only "displaces" human subjects from the *center* of sociological accounting (avoiding placing any particular subject at such a center). For a full discussion here, see Pickering (1993, 1995).

3 For descriptions of these examples see *inter alia* Soekkha (1997), Sivak and Tsimhoni (2008).
4 The notion of non-human objects possessing agency is controversial. At its most minimal level, posthumanism uses this term merely to focus on the fact that material objects "make-difference" on human beings, although others are far more radical in their interpretations. See, for discussions, Sayes (2014), Pickering (2001).
5 On Actor Network Theory, see Latour (2005), Mol (2011), Law (2009), and on assemblage theory, see DeLanda (2016), Coyne (2008).
6 For a good introductory review of these alternative effects, see Wolfe (2010).
7 Interview conducted by the author in Beirut, Lebanon. Names of respondents are anonymized. For full details on these interviews see Austin (2016b, 2017a).
8 See https://tinyurl.com/ycu29554.
9 For examples see (Keller 2007; Lagouranis 2007; National Defense Intelligence College 2006; Tsukayama 2014).
10 For further reading here, see the references throughout the paper, and/or for a good introduction, see Wolfe (2010).

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